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U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Extent of State 
Medicaid Lien Statutes 
-by Roger A. McEowen*
Medicaid is the joint federal/state program that pays for long-term health care in a nursing 
home.1	To	be	able	to	receive	Medicaid	benefits,	an	individual	must	meet	numerous	eligibility	
requirements but, in short, must have a very minimal level of income and assets. State law 
typically	allows	the	state	Medicaid	agency	to	file	a	claim	in	a	deceased	Medicaid	recipient’s	
estate	to	recoup	Medicaid	benefits	paid	during	the	recipient’s	lifetime,2 and also authorizes 
a	statutory	lien	to	the	extent	of	Medicaid	benefits	paid.3 In general, the amount of the lien 
is set at the amount of assistance the state Medicaid agency pays to the individual after the 
person has been eligible for Medicaid for six months.4 But, while federal law authorizes 
such state liens on monetary claims the Medicaid recipient may have, it bars placing a lien 
on	a	Medicaid	recipient’s	property	before	death,5 except under certain circumstances.6 
Federal Medicaid law also permits states to place liens against monetary claims the 
Medicaid recipient may have from third parties.7 The state agency must take reasonable steps 
to determine the legal liability of third parties to pay for the medical care of the Medicaid 
recipient, and the lien attaches to that obligation.8 But, a question has existed as to whether a 
state’s	lien	is	limited	to	just	those	portions	of	any	third	party	payments	a	Medicaid	recipient	
is entitled to that are designated as being for medical expenses, or whether the lien applies 
to	all	third	party	payments	a	recipient	is	entitled	to	the	extent	of	Medicaid	benefits	paid.	
The U.S. Supreme Court has now answered that question.9 
Facts of Ahlborn10 
The plaintiff was permanently disabled in an automobile accident. During her medical 
care	she	received	benefits	under	the	Arkansas	Medicaid	program.		State	law	required	the	
plaintiff to assign to the state Medicaid agency (Arkansas Department of Health and Human 
Services (ADHS)) her “right to any settlement, judgment, or award” she may receive from 
third	parties,	“to	the	full	extent	of	any	amount	which	may	be	paid	by	Medicaid	for	the	benefit	
of	the	applicant.”		The	plaintiff	received	$215,645.30	in	Medicaid	benefits.		A	few	years	later,	
the plaintiff received $550,000 as the result of a settlement of the litigation involving the 
auto accident. That total included amounts for past and future pain and suffering, medical 
claims,	loss	of	earnings	and	working	time,	and	the	plaintiff’s	permanent	inability	to	earn	
income in the future. Only $35,581 of the settlement proceeds were for medical expenses, 
but the state Medicaid agency asserted a lien against the proceeds for $215,645.30 - the 
full	amount	it	had	paid	for	the	plaintiff’s	care.	 
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The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the state 
Medicaid agency could only recover $35,581, the portion of the 
settlement that represented her claim to medical expenses. The 
plaintiff	reasoned	that	the	state’s	Medicaid	recovery	was	limited	
to third-party payments for health care services. To do otherwise, 
the plaintiff claimed, would violate federal Medicaid law, which 
ensures	that	a	Medicaid	recipient’s	property	will	not	be	depleted	
during	the	recipient’s	life	by	a	state	seeking	reimbursement	for	its	
medical assistance.11	ADHS	argued	that	its	lien	did	not	conflict	
with	the	federal	law,	because	the	plaintiff’s	third	party	settlement	
was not her “property” until the state was fully reimbursed for 
all funds expended on medical care. The trial court agreed with 
the state,12 but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reversed.13 According to the Eighth Circuit, while the 
federal statutory scheme required the plaintiff to assign her rights 
to recover from third parties for the costs of medical care and 
services incurred as a result of the accident, it also protected her 
other property from recovery by the state. The Eighth Circuit 
sent the case back to the trial court with directions to enter a 
judgment for ADHS in the amount of $35,581.47, the amount 
of the settlement allocated for medical care. 
The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
ADHS asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. They 
agreed to do so in the fall of 2005,14 and have now unanimously 
agreed with the Eighth Circuit, holding that the federal Medicaid 
law	did	not	authorize	the	state	to	assert	a	lien	on	the	plaintiff’s	
settlement in an amount exceeding the $35,000 for medical care, 
and that the federal anti-lien provision actually barred the state 
from doing so.15 The Court pointed out that the portion of the 
federal Medicaid statute that allows states to condition Medicaid 
eligibility on assigning to the state rights to payment for medical 
care from a third party meant precisely what it stated – that the 
right of ADHS to payments from third parties was limited to 
payments for medical care and did not include rights to other 
types of payments such as lost wages. In addition, the federal 
anti-lien provision which bars states from asserting a lien against 
a	 Medicaid	 recipient’s	 property	 (except	 under	 the	 conditions	
mentioned above) precluded attachment or encumbrance of 
any	part	of	the	plaintiff’s	settlement	that	was	not	designated	as	
being	for	medical	payments.		ADHS	characterized	the	plaintiff’s	
settlement as not her “property” in an attempt to avoid application 
of the federal anti-lien statute. The Court disagreed, pointing out 
that the settlement was “received from a third party” (as required 
by federal law for a state lien to apply) only upon being reduced 
to	proceeds	in	the	plaintiff’s	possession.		As	such,	the	proceeds	
never belonged to the state. Likewise, the Court reasoned that 
the	 state’s	 argument	 that	 the	plaintiff	 lost	 her	 property	 rights	
in the proceeds the moment she applied for medical assistance 
was inconsistent with the creation of statutory lien on those 
proceeds. ADHS, the Court pointed out, would not need a lien 
if the settlement proceeds belonged to ADHS.  
Impact on State Lien Statutes 
The	Supreme	Court’s	opinion	in	Ahlborn,16 would appear to 
have no direct impact on some state lien statutes. For example, 
the Kansas lien statute17 appears to conform to the federal 
requirements and limits the lien to the amount of assistance the 
state Medicaid agency pays after the expiration of six months 
from the date the Medicaid recipient becomes Medicaid-eligible. 
However, other state Medicaid lien statutes may now be at least 
partially invalidated. For instance, while the Iowa statute18 
appears	to	limit	the	state’s	lien	to	claims	a	Medicaid	recipient	
has	against	third	parties	to	the	extent	of	Medicaid	benefits	paid	
to the recipient - “… the department shall have a lien, to the 
extent	of	 those	payments	 [i.e.,	Medicaid	benefits	paid	 to	 the	
recipient], upon all monetary claims which the recipient may 
have against third parties….”, additional language in the same 
statute providing that, “…A settlement, award, or judgment 
structured in any manner not to include medical expenses or 
an action brought by a recipient or on behalf of a recipient 
which fails to state a claim for recovery of medical expenses 
does	not	defeat	the	department’s	lien	if	there	is	any	recovery	
on	the	recipient’s	claim.”,	would	appear	 to	extend	the	state’s	
lien	 to	amounts	a	Medicaid	beneficiary	 is	entitled	 to	 that	are	
not for medical care. If that is the case, the statute is invalid to 
the extent it gives the state a right to assert a lien on third party 
payments that are not for medical care. Consequently, it appears 
that the Iowa provision (and any other state statute with similar 
language) will now need to be amended in accordance with the 
Supreme	Court’s	ruling.		 
Footnotes 
1 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. The states are not required to 
participate in Medicaid, but all of them do. The program is 
cooperative in nature – the Federal Government pays between 
50 percent and 83 percent of the costs the State incurs for 
patient care and, in return, the State pays its portion of the 
costs and complies with certain statutory requirements for 
making eligibility determinations, collecting and maintaining 
information, and administering the program. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396(a).
2 See, e.g., Iowa Code § 249A.5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-
709(g)(2).
3 For example, under Iowa law, the lien applies to all monetary 
claims which the Medicaid recipient may have against third 
parties. Iowa Code § 249A.6. Under Kansas law, the lien can 
be	filed	against	the	Medicaid	recipient’s	real	property	(typically	
the	recipient’s	home)	after	a	determination	has	been	made	that	
the individual cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged 
from the nursing home to return to their residence. A six-month 
period of compensated inpatient care at a nursing home, nursing 
homes or other medical institution constitutes a determination 
that the Medicaid recipient cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged and return home. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(g)(4). To 
“return home” means the Medicaid recipient leaves the nursing 
home or medical facility and resides for at least 90 days in the 
home on which the lien has been placed without being readmitted 
as an inpatient to a nursing medical facility.  Id. 
4 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(g)(4). Under Kansas 
law, the state Medicaid agency must provide notice and an 
opportunity	for	a	hearing	before	filing	the	lien.		While	the	lien	 
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may	be	enforced	either	before	or	after	the	Medicaid	recipient’s	
death	by	the	filing	of	an	action	to	foreclose	the	lien	in	the	county	
district court (or through an estate probate court action), it may be 
enforced	only	after	the	death	of	the	recipient’s	surviving	spouse	
and (1) when there is no child who is 20 years old or less residing in 
the home; (2) when there is no adult child who is blind or disabled 
that resides in the home, and (3) when there is no brother or sister 
of the Medicaid recipient that lawfully resides in the home who has 
resided there for at least a year immediately before the date of the 
Medicaid	recipient’s	admission	to	the	nursing	or	medical	facility,	
and has resided there on a continuous basis since that time. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1).
6 Id. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1) provides that, as a condition of 
eligibility, the individual must assign to the state any rights to 
payment for medical care from any third party.  
8 Under the typical state statute, the lien is dissolved if the 
Medicaid recipient leaves the nursing facility and resides in 
the property subject to the lien for a period of more than 90 
days without being readmitted as an inpatient to a nursing or 
medical facility, even though there may have been no reasonable
expectation that this would occur. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-
709(6)(D). If the Medicaid recipient is readmitted to a nursing 
or medical facility during this period, and does return home after 
being released, another 90 days must be completed before the lien 
can be dissolved. Id. The lien also becomes dormant and ceases 
to operate as a lien if the state Medicaid agency does not take 
action	to	foreclose	the	lien	within	10	years	of	filing	the	lien.		Id. 
The dormant lien may be revived in the same manner as a dormant 
judgment is revived under Kansas law.  Id. 
9 Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al. v. 
Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
10 Id. 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a).
12 Ahlborn v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human 
Services, 280 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D. Ark. 2003). 
13 Id., 397 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2005). 
14 Id., cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
15 Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al. v. 
Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
16 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
17 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(4). 
18 Iowa Code § 249A.6(1). 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
PRESCRIPTIVE ACQUISITION. Note: prescriptive 
acquisition is a civil law doctrine similar to adverse possession. 
The plaintiffs owned land south of the disputed property which had 
been in the family since 1940. The plaintiffs presented evidence 
that the disputed property had been used by family members 
since that time for recreation, pasture, hunting and farming. The 
defendants purchased their land neighboring the disputed property 
in 1963 and claimed that purchase included the disputed property. 
The defendants paid taxes on the disputed property from that 
time and argued that the purchase of the property interrupted the 
adverse possession of the disputed property by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants acknowledged that they had not exercised physical 
occupation of the land but argued that the payment of taxes and 
occasional	viewing	of	the	land	were	sufficient	to	maintain	title	
to the land. The defendant also pointed to the fact that when 
they purchased their land in 1963, an ancestor of the plaintiffs 
had offered to buy the disputed property from the defendants, 
indicating that the plaintiffs knew that they did not own the 
land. Finally, the defendants had executed mineral leases for the 
disputed property and argued that all of their actions involving 
the	property	interrupted	the	plaintiff’s	possession	of	the	land.	The	 
court	held	that	the	activities	of	the	plaintiffs	were	sufficient	exercise	
of control over the property for over 30 years to pass title to them
under prescriptive acquisition. The court noted that, even if the 
actions	of	the	defendants	interrupted	the	plaintiffs’	possession,	the	
plaintiffs’	activities	on	the	disputed	property	re-established	control	
and possession within one year and, under La. Civ. Code art. 3465, 
repossession within one year removes the interruption. Prince v. 
Palermo Land Co., 2006 La. App. LEXIS 1022 (La. Ct. App. 
2006). 
ANIMALS 
BULL. The plaintiff was working with a carpenter in repairing 
the cow barn for the defendant. The defendant did not know that the 
plaintiff was present on the farm or that the plaintiff was working 
in the cow barn. The plaintiff and the carpenter did not know that 
the defendant had a dairy bull loose with the other dairy cows. The 
plaintiff	was	injured	by	the	defendant’s	dairy	bull	while	working	in	
the	barn	and	filed	suit	in	strict	liability	and	negligence	against	the	
defendant and carpenter for the cost of the injuries. Applying the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509, the court held that the standard 
of care for owners of domestic farm animals was that the owner 
would be liable for harm caused by animals which the owner knew 
had vicious propensities. The court held that the defendant was not 
liable	for	the	plaintiff’s	injury	because	the	evidence	demonstrated	 
